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Abstract 
 
Since the introduction of the EU citizenship in 1992 the freedom of movement 
and residence within the Union has lead to an ever increasing number of individuals 
residing in another EU member-state than their own. These intra-EU migrants have 
increasingly been granted the same rights as the citizens of their country of residence, 
with one conspicuous exception: voting rights in national elections. It seems paradox, 
however, that those EU-citizens who embody the idea of European citizenship the most – 
those who migrate to reside in another EU member-state – are granted democratic 
representation through the right to vote at the municipal and European levels, but not at 
the national level in their country of residence. This paper investigates how the absence 
of voting rights for intra-EU migrants affects their sense of democratic representation. 
More specifically, this paper seeks to determine whether intra-EU migrants differ from 
citizens in their satisfaction with democracy in their country of residence and in the EU, 
estimating two ordinal logit models using data collected through 11 Eurobarometer 
surveys ranging from 1997 to 2004. The results indicate that intra-EU migrants are more 
likely to be satisfied with democracy than citizens, both in their country of residence and 
in the EU, thus suggesting that direct representation through the participation in national 
elections may not be as important as suggested in previous research. However, the 
finding that a greater ideological distance to the median citizen in the country of 
residence is associated with a lesser satisfaction with democracy suggests that virtual 
representation, in the more general sense, takes the place of the narrower notion of 
institutionalized representation, at least in the mind of the masses. These findings help 
shed some light on the puzzle of representation within the context of European 
integration, and the fact that contrary to public opinion, European elites argue for 
institutionalized representation, shows that the duality of and tension between virtual and 
actual representation, as suggested by Hanna Pitkin, very much exists in the EU today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Introduction 
Since the introduction of the European Union (EU) citizenship through the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, the freedom of movement and residence within the Union has lead to an ever 
increasing number of individuals residing in another EU member-state, from 4.8 million in 1993 
to over 6 million in 2000 (Recchi 2005). These intra-EU migrants have been granted an ever 
greater equality in citizen rights, to the point of being treated like a citizen in almost every way, 
but with one conspicuous exception: voting rights in national elections (Cesarani and Fulbrook 
1996; Day and Shaw 2002; Dell'Olio 2005; Dinan 2004; Koslowski 1994). The importance of 
intra-EU migrant voting rights for the development of the EU citizenship have been well 
recognized, leading to the introduction of the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections of 
the European Parliament and in municipal elections granted in the Treaty on European Union 
(Treaty on European Union 1992). Many argue, however, that the inclusion of these rights makes 
the absence of voting rights in national elections an even more obvious problem for the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Day and Shaw 2002; 
Koslowski 1994).  
As indicated above, migration rates between the EU member states have steadily 
increased since the Treaty of Maastricht, and with the most recent waves of enlargement (with 
ten Eastern and Central European States joining in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania joining in 
2007), the number of intra-EU migrants is likely to increase even more. With residents of other 
EU member-states comprising an ever larger proportion of the population in the member states, 
and with the notion of European Citizenship playing an ever larger role in the Treaties, the 
argument for granting intra-EU migrants the right to vote in national elections in their country of 
residence is stronger than ever. It seems like the EU, in its efforts to deepen integration and 
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enforce the notion of a European citizenship, is facing a dilemma: the EU citizens who embody 
the idea of European citizenship the most—those who migrate to and reside in another EU 
member state—are granted democratic representation through the right to vote at the local and 
the European, but not at the national level of their country of residence. In light of this dilemma, 
the purpose of this project is to seek an answer to the following question: How does the absence 
of voting rights for intra-EU migrants in the national elections of their country of residence affect 
their sense of democratic representation?  
 
  Robert Dahl argues that democratic citizenship requires the inclusion of all adult subjects 
to the binding collective decisions of an association (Dahl 1989). Following from this, few would 
argue against voting rights as a fundamental citizen right to political participation, and this has 
been one of the leading arguments for the introduction of voting rights for intra-EU migrants on 
some—if not yet all—levels of the EU polity (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Day and Shaw 
2002; Dell'Olio 2005; Hettne 2002; Koslowski 1994; Recchi 2005; Bhabha 1999). Beside the 
argument that equal citizen rights are crucial for building the foundation for a meaningful 
European citizenship, others argue that adequate democratic representation of EU citizens at all 
levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Marsh and Norris 
1997; Marsh and Wessels 1997; Schmidt 2004; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997).  
  The question posed by this paper—whether intra-EU migrants feel less politically 
represented in their country of residence than citizens—is justified by the actual lack of 
institutional representation through the right to participate in general elections at the member-
state level. A slightly different question that must be asked before proceeding to the analysis, 
however, is whether and why it actually matters if people feel represented. Our notion of 
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representative government, as Hanna Pitkin argues, incorporates a duality of and tension between 
a very general idea of representation and a narrower idea of its institutionalization, similar to 
Burke’s distinction between virtual and actual representation (Pitkin 1967). It appears that if 
representation is seen in the narrower institutional sense, it matters very much if people feel 
represented or not, and if they do not, institutional reform must be sought. If representation is 
seen in the more general sense, however, assuming that people can be represented through other 
channels than direct elections, they may be represented whether or not they feel represented; and 
they may feel represented despite a lack of institutionalized representation.  
  The literature on political representation has to a large extent emphasized the narrower 
institutional concept of representation, examining the effects of electoral laws, policy-interest 
congruence, and elite decision-making strategies on the quality of representation (Arnold 1990; 
Lublin 1997; Powell 2000; Riker 1986; Weissberg 1978). More recently, however, some 
scholars have questioned this institutional focus, and instead suggested that people may simply 
not want to participate in politics, and that a more general concept of representation may be more 
appropriate (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This view, 
which resembles the notion of Burke’s virtual representation where citizens may be content with 
their interests being represented in other ways than direct elections, suggests a more relaxed 
expectation of whether it matters if people feel represented or not. 
  Research on European integration and the development of the European Union has 
traditionally fallen under the umbrella of studies in international relations, treating the EU mainly 
as an international organization (Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). In the course of a deeper 
European integration, however, an increased tendency to look at the EU as a single polity can be 
observed (Hettne 2002; Risse 2004; Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). In recent years, the EU 
  3      
has transformed into a political hybrid without a contemporary or historical counterpart, 
inspiring scholars in various academic fields to question the relationship between nation and 
state, centralization and decentralization, and the traditional meaning of notions like democracy 
and citizenship (Bellamy 2006; Biersteker 1999; Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996; Greven and Pauly 
2000; Guibernau 1999; Schmitter 2000).  
  The research question of this study can mainly be placed at the intersection of two 
partially and increasingly overlapping sub-literatures on European integration which correspond 
to the two main arguments for extending voting rights to intra-EU migrants—the literature on 
European citizenship and the literature on the democracy deficit of the EU. The former has 
grown increasingly salient in the course of the establishment of EU citizen rights in the Treaties 
of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, and especially the link between the idea of a common 
citizenship across all the EU member-states and the phenomenon of increasing intra-EU 
migration makes the research question of this study highly relevant (Bellamy 2006; Dell'Olio 
2005; Koslowski 1994). The literature and debate on the democracy deficit of the EU has existed 
as long as direct elections to the European Parliament have taken place, but has grown more 
salient through the transfer of power from the member-states to the EU, and through repeated 
enlargement waves which have increased the urgency of the problem (Schmidt 2004; Schmitt 
and Thomassen 1999; Schmitter 2000; Zielonka 2004).
1  
In addition to these two literatures, the research question also fits into a new, growing 
literature on intra-EU migration, an issue which has only recently gained scholarly interest, and 
where further research is urgently requested (Bellamy 2006; Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; 
Day and Shaw 2002; Recchi 2005; Waldrauch 2003).  In some recent research scholars perform 
qualitative analysis of the specific case of EU electoral rights and their connection to EU 
                                                 
1 For a concise introduction to the democracy deficit, see (McCormick 2005), p. 132-139. 
  4      
citizenship and democracy—a sign both of the growing salience of the issue, and of the need for 
alternative empirical testing of their hypotheses (Connolly, Day, and Shaw 2006; Waldrauch 
2003). 
Karp, Banducci and Bowler use the data of one Eurobarometer survey (EB 52.0 from 
1999) to examine what factors are associated with citizen evaluations of democratic performance 
in the EU, and although they use some of the same control variables as this study, they do not 
distinguish between intra-EU migrants and citizens (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003). My 
contribution to the literature therefore lies in the fact that I test hypotheses connecting the notion 
of EU citizenship and satisfaction with democracy with rigorous quantitative analysis of 
longitudinal data from all EU member-states. 
  Based on the above cited literature suggesting that equal citizen rights are crucial for 
building the foundation for a meaningful European citizenship, and that adequate democratic 
representation of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU, and based on the more narrow view of institutionalized representation we 
may expect to find support for the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Intra-EU migrants with no right to vote in national elections are less satisfied  
    with how democracy works in their country of residence than citizens, all else  
   equal. 
 
The logic behind this hypothesis is that the right to vote in national elections increases the sense 
of democratic representation. A particular institutional setting comprising a special case of intra-
EU migrant rights is that unlike all other intra-EU migrants, British citizens living in Ireland, and 
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Irish citizens living in the United Kingdom do have the right to vote in national elections, and 
thus, based on the same logic as the first hypothesis, we may also expect to find support for the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Intra-EU migrants with a right to vote in national elections in their country of 
residence are more satisfied with democracy than intra-EU migrants without this 
right, all else equal 
 
Yet another useful field of comparison results from the fact that since 1994 all intra-EU 
migrants are granted the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections of the European 
Parliament in their country of residence. Thus, since they enjoy rights equaling those of citizens 
in these elections, contrary to the expectations of hypothesis one and two, we may expect to find 
support for the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Intra-EU migrants and citizens are equally satisfied with how democracy works 
in the EU, all else equal.  
 
Based on the more general view of representation, as presented by Pitkin, we may assume 
that, despite the absence of the right to vote, other, non-institutionalized channels may increase 
intra-EU migrants’ sense of representation. One example of such an alternative channel of 
representation can be found in the scholarly assumption that there is a positive relationship 
between median correspondence and democratic representation (Castles and Mair 1984; 
Inglehart and Huber 1995; Knutsen 1998; Powell and Vanberg 2000; Van der Eijk and Franklin 
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1991). In other words, we may assume that the closer the interests of an intra-EU migrant are to 
the interests of the median citizen in that country, the more likely he or she is to feel represented, 
and thus to be satisfied with how democracy works, based on the perception that others represent 
his or her interests for him or her. Similarly, one could assume that in any representative 
democracy, the ideal case of representation is the inclusion of the median citizen position in the 
governing party or coalition, and thus this measure could be assumed to be a proxy for the 
distance to the governing party. Following from this we may expect to find support for the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Intra-EU migrants with no voting rights are more likely to be satisfied with how 
democracy works in their country of residence the smaller the ideological 
distance to the median citizen, all else equal 
 
Data
The analysis will use cross-sectional individual and aggregate level data, collected from 
various sources which will be described and evaluated below. The primary data to be utilized is a 
number of Eurobarometer Surveys ranging from November 1997 (EB 48.0) to March 2004 (EB 
61.0)—the most recently conducted survey for which the data is available (Christensen 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c; European Commission 2004b; European Commission 2004a; Hartung 2002, 
2003; Melich 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). The reason for the time span of the case selection is 
that intra-EU migrants have only been included in the Eurobarometer surveys since 1994, and 
that the survey questions operationalizing the two dependent variables were both asked in 
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selected surveys starting with the EB 48.0 in 1997.
2 The case selection thus incorporates every 
survey since November 1997 in which the questions on satisfaction with democracy in the 
country of the interview and in the EU were asked. The data is unique both in its scope and in its 
characteristics, as around 16,000 citizens from all EU member-states were interviewed in each 
survey. The universe for all surveys was all persons age 15 and over residing in the member 
states of the EU, and the samples of all surveys were designed as multi-stage probability samples 
in the single countries. The fact that identical surveys were simultaneously conducted in all EU 
member-states at several points in time vastly increases the comparability of the data across 
member-states and time. The fact that each individual interviewed was not only coded on the 
country in which the interview took place, but also on his or her citizenship, makes the data extra 
ordinarily useful for the purposes of this analysis. In addition to this, the datasets have been 
widely used in scholarly analysis since their release.
3
For the purpose of this analysis, the data from each of the surveys was cleaned, recoded 
and merged into one large dataset, yielding an analysis sample of 132,164 individuals for the 
analysis of the first dependent variable, and 117,225 individuals for the analysis of the second 
dependent variable. As is often the case in studies using large-scale survey data, the cleaning and 
recoding of the individual level survey data to prepare it for the analysis involved several steps 
leading to a gradual decrease of the sample size, which are summarized in Table 1. First, since 
the aim of this paper is to analyze and compare the attitudes of EU citizens residing in their home 
country or in another EU member-state, citizens of other countries than the EU member-states as 
well as individuals with dual citizenship were excluded from the sample. Second, resulting from 
                                                 
2 The first survey to incorporate intra-EU migrants into the survey samples was the Eurobarometer 41.1 (conducted 
in March-June of 1994). All previous Eurobarometer surveys instructed the interviewers to close the interview if the 
respondent was not a citizen of the country in which the interview was conducted. 
3 For an overview, the codebooks of all surveys can be reviewed on the ICPSR website at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/  
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the respondents’ failure to answer one or more of the survey questions, data was missing on one 
or more of the variables included in this analysis, and these observations were consequently 
dropped from the analysis sample.
4
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Methodology 
  The methodology utilized for testing the hypotheses posed above is multivariate 
regression analysis, estimating two ordinal logit models for each of the dependent variables, 
using individual survey data collected through 11 Eurobarometer Surveys in the years 1997 to 
2004. Methodologically, there are indeed many ways to answer the posed research question, 
which in my opinion all have their advantages and disadvantages. The reason why I chose to use 
quantitative analysis, and more specifically multivariate regression analysis, is threefold. First, 
this method poses a unique way of estimating relationships between a large number of 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables with an accuracy that is superior to other 
methods. Second, this method is particularly useful considering the nature of the data I am using 
for the analysis—large-scale survey data representative of the populations of all EU member 
states, over several years. Third, the previous use of multivariate regression analysis in the 
specific topic of this study is limited, and may lead to new insights that have not yet been 
reached. 
 
                                                 
4 Descriptive statistics of the analysis sample is available in the Appendix, Table 5.  
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The Variables 
  A summary of the variables, their operationalizations, and the corresponding survey 
questions on which they are based is displayed in Table 2.
5 Before specifying the models, 
however, the operationalizations of the variables will be discussed in greater detail.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  The dependent variable, sense of democratic representation, is operationalized based on 
two repeatedly asked questions in the Eurobarometer Surveys. The questions ask respondents to 
state on a four-point categorical scale how satisfied they are with the way democracy works, in 
their country (i.e. the country of residence), and in the EU.
6 This is the simplest, and the most 
suitable, available measure for capturing potential differences between individuals who have the 
right to vote in national elections (member-state citizens and intra-EU migrants with the right to 
vote) and intra-EU migrants who do not have this right. Whereas the usefulness of this particular 
survey question has been debated in the literature, the main critique is that it is insufficient as a 
measure for political support, mainly because it does not include any mention of political leaders, 
parties, or policies (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; 
Norris 1999). This critique matters little for the construct I am hoping to tap, however, since I am 
interested in whether individuals feel represented at all, rather than to what degree they feel that 
their personal interests are represented.  
                                                 
5 The question number refers to the numbering in the most recent survey used in this paper, the Eurobarometer 61.0. 
As some of the question numbers may vary slightly between the surveys, please see each of the codebooks for 
reference to the question numbers. Also see appendix for the exact question wording. 
6 The exact wording of all survey questions can be found in the appendix. 
  10      
  The first two independent variables of interest—intra-EU migrant status with national 
voting rights, and intra-EU migrant status without national voting rights—were operationalized 
as dummy variables coded one or zero depending on the combination of the answers to the 
survey questions on the nationality of the respondent and the country in which the interview was 
conducted. The third key independent variable—Ideological distance—was created by measuring 
the absolute difference between each respondent’s self-placement on a ten-point left-right scale 
and the self-placement of the median non-intra-EU migrant in the respective country at the time. 
Whereas many studies rely on expert judgments of party positions on the left-right scale, the 
scope of my analysis does not allow me to use such a measure, since this would require accurate 
judgments for all parties at the time of each of the 11 surveys included in my sample. In addition 
to this measure, and because the impact of the ideological distance from the median citizen is 
assumed to be conditional on intra-EU migrant status and voting rights, I included an interaction 
term generated by multiplying the ideological distance by the dummy variable migrants without 
voting rights. 
  A number of additional independent variables are included as control variables. First, I 
include a variable measuring the attitudes towards the EU, using a survey question that asks the 
respondent to assess whether they believe that their country’s EU-membership is a good thing, a 
bad thing, or neither good nor bad. I assume that a more positive attitude towards the EU will be 
associated with a lesser satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence, and with a 
greater satisfaction with democracy in the EU. Second, I include a variable measuring the 
political connectedness of the respondent, using a question in the surveys that asks about the 
frequency with which the respondent discusses political matters with friends.  
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Third, I include a variable measuring the distance in time to the most recent national elections 
held in the county of residence, assuming that the shorter this time, the greater the awareness of 
the lack of voting-rights, and the lesser the satisfaction with democracy at the country level will 
be among intra-EU migrants. Fourth, I include a dummy variable for whether the respondent is a 
student or not, as a proxy accounting for any differences between intra-EU migrants who are 
permanent working residents, and intra-EU migrants who may only stay in their country of 
residence for a short period of time. I assume that students, who are likely to stay for a shorter 
period of time, and who do not pay taxes to the same extent as working intra-EU migrants in 
their country of residence, are less likely to care about democracy at the member-state level.
7
Finally, I include the three standard demographic variables education, gender, and age, all for 
which questions are included in the surveys.
8
 
The Regression Model 
The two regression models that will be estimated can thus be summarized in the 
following equation: 
 
Yi =   β0 + β1migvotei + β2mignovotei + β3ideciti + β4idecit×mignovotei + β5euatti + β6polconi + 
β7timeeleci + β8studenti + β9agei + β10edui + β11malei + β12survey2i + … + β21survey11i + 
β22intcount2i + … + β35intcount15i + ei
 
                                                 
7 It should be mentioned that the only requirement for acquiring permanent resident status in another EU member 
state is that an individual has proof of employment, whereas the residence permit for students automatically ends 
with the end of the program of study. 
8 Initially, I included a variable for household income, but as more than a third of all respondents refused to answer 
this survey question, and since the inclusion of the variable made a minimal difference in the regression outcomes, I 
decided to exclude it from the analysis model.  
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Results 
Based on the results presented in Table 3, several findings stand out. Overall, the model 
estimating satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence yielded statistically 
significant coefficients for all but one key independent variable, with some surprising results 
regarding the signs of the coefficients. First, the results suggest that intra-EU migrants with no 
voting rights are more likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than 
citizens. Second, and also contrary to expectations, intra-EU migrants with a right to vote in 
national elections are less likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than 
citizens, and consequently migrants without voting rights. Third, the negative coefficient on the 
variable ideological distance suggests that overall, the larger the ideological distance to the 
median citizen in the country of residence, the greater the dissatisfaction with democracy, as 
expected. Although the interaction term indicating the difference in the effect of ideological 
distance for migrants without voting rights is not statistically significant, practically, the negative 
sign of the coefficient suggests that a larger ideological distance may have a greater negative 
effect on non-voting migrants than on voting migrants and citizens.
9
The model estimating satisfaction with democracy in the EU yielded statistically 
significant coefficients for all independent variables, and with somewhat less surprising results 
than the first model. The results suggest the failure to reject the third hypothesis, however, which 
stated an expectation of equal satisfaction with democracy in the EU among intra-EU migrants 
and citizens. As the first two coefficients in the right column of Table 3 indicate intra-EU 
migrants, regardless of whether they have the right to vote in national elections or not, are overall 
more likely to be satisfied with democracy in the EU than citizens. Although inconsistent with 
                                                 
9 An identical regression with an interaction term of all migrants and ideological distance yielded a negative 
coefficient significant at the 10% level, which may be an indication that with a larger number of cases, the 
interaction term of non-voting migrants and ideological distance may be statistically significant as well. 
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the theoretical expectation, practically this result is less surprising, and may be an effect of the 
possibility that individuals who leave their home country to migrate to a different EU-country are 
by definition more open to the idea of European integration, and thus more likely to be satisfied 
with EU democracy.  
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Whereas the results in Table 3 are useful for assessing the statistical significance and the 
positive or negative direction of the various effects, the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated 
with an ordinal logit model are due to the nonlinearity of the model not easily interpreted. A 
more direct approach for interpretation is to examine the predicted probabilities of an event for 
different values of the independent variables (Long 1997). Table 4 displays the predicted 
probabilities of the different levels of satisfaction with democracy in the country of residence and 
in the EU for each type of respondent. These statistics confirm the puzzling patterns displayed in 
Table 3, suggesting that migrants without voting rights are almost seven percentage points more 
likely than citizens, and almost twice as likely as migrants with voting rights to be fairly or very 
satisfied with democracy in the country of residence. The predicted probabilities for satisfaction 
with democracy in the EU show a more even pattern, also confirming the regression findings, in 
that around 61% of intra-EU migrants, regardless of whether they have the right to vote in 
national elections or not, are fairly or very satisfied with EU-democracy – about ten percentage 
points more than citizens. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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  Figures 1.A and 1.B display how the predicted probabilities of different levels of 
satisfaction with democracy change in response to an increasing ideological distance to the 
median citizen. The first figure confirms the negative coefficient on ideological distance yielded 
for the overall sample, but the different plots for the different groups reveals yet another puzzle 
that the regression coefficient did not capture. The figure reveals that the likelihood of being 
fairly satisfied with democracy decreases (and the likelihood of being not very satisfied 
increases) with a growing ideological distance for citizens and for migrants without voting rights, 
as expected. The puzzle is, however, that the relationship is reversed for migrants with voting 
rights, meaning that a greater ideological distance increases the likelihood of being fairly 
satisfied and decreases the likelihood of being not very satisfied with democracy. Beside this 
puzzling fact, another noteworthy observation that supports the fourth hypothesis is that migrants 
without voting rights have a consistently higher probability of being fairly satisfied, and a 
consistently lower probability of being not very satisfied with democracy than citizens. 
 
[Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
  
An entirely different pattern is displayed in Figure 1.B, which plots the predicted 
probabilities of different levels of satisfaction with EU-democracy. Here all three groups follow 
the same pattern of a decreasing likelihood of being fairly satisfied (and an increasing likelihood 
of being not very satisfied) with democracy the greater the ideological distance. What is striking 
about this graph, however, is that the relationship between satisfaction and dissatisfaction is 
reversed, with a higher probability of being not very satisfied than of being satisfied, for both 
citizens and migrants without voting rights. In the case of intra-EU migrants with voting rights, 
the probabilities intersect at a low ideological distance before following the pattern of the other 
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groups. The fact that the differences between the probabilities for each group at the baseline of 
minimal ideological distance (i.e. when the ideological self-placement is identical or close to 
identical with that of the median citizen) is much smaller than in the case of democracy in the 
country of residence suggests a greater coherence in satisfaction with EU-democracy, since more 
individuals are likely to be close to a minimal than to a maximal ideological distance. Finally, the 
fact that citizens are the least likely to be fairly satisfied and the most likely to be not very 
satisfied with EU-democracy confirms the suggestion made earlier that individuals who leave 
their home country to migrate to a different EU-country may by definition be more open to the 
idea of European integration, and thus more likely to be satisfied with EU democracy. 
Discussion 
Despite the fact that many argue for equal citizen rights as being crucial for building the 
foundation for a meaningful European citizenship, and that adequate democratic representation 
of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for the democratic legitimacy of the EU, 
little has yet been done to empirically examine the relationship between citizenship and 
democracy in light of increasing intra-EU migration, between intra-EU migration and 
representation. One possible omitted variable that may confound the results of this analysis is the 
duration for which an individual has resided in the interview country, assuming that the longer 
the duration, the more assimilated this individual is likely to be to the host polity, and the less 
satisfied with democracy the individual is likely to be in the absence of voting-rights. As none of 
the surveys ask the respondents for the duration of their stay, however, no data for such a 
variable was available. 
Another possibly confounding variable that could explain the puzzling pattern of a lower 
likelihood of satisfaction with democracy among Irish in the United Kingdom and British in 
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Ireland, despite the privilege of voting rights in national elections, is the factor of proximity to 
the home country. First, the mere geographical distance may play a role in determining how 
attached to the home culture an individual remains. Second, if the language of the host country is 
the same or similar to an individual’s native language, cultural assimilation to the host country 
may also be slower. My argument is that for an Irishman residing in the United Kingdom, or a 
Swede in Denmark, for that matter, the incentives to immerse into the host culture, and “become 
a citizen” of that country, may be considerably lower than for someone who has traveled further, 
learned to master a foreign language, and cannot travel home as easily. Adding a variable 
controlling for proximity to the home country may help solve part of the puzzle. In addition to 
this, other variables specific to certain combinations of migrants and host countries, for example 
historical political relations, may influence the degree to which an individual feels affinity 
towards the host country, and thus bias the response on the question about satisfaction with 
democracy. 
Another limitation of the results of the analysis that all research using survey data has to 
deal with is the fact that results are based on a small sample of the population universe. Whereas 
this is less likely to be a problem for the category citizens, which consisted of a very large 
sample of 129,129 observations (114,402 for the second dependent variable), the problem may 
be larger regarding the categories on which this paper focused—Intra-EU migrants without 
voting rights, which consisted of a sample of 2,492 observations (2,383 for the second dependent 
variable), and above all intra-EU migrants with voting rights, which consisted of a sample of 
only 543 observations (440 for the second dependent variable). It is a possibility, although not a 
certainty that the puzzling results regarding migrants with voting rights would be resolved with a 
larger sample size. 
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Finally, conducting multiple regression analysis using variables—dependent and 
independent—that have not been analyzed in a similar manner in earlier research poses particular 
difficulties, since there are no precedents as to how to build the regression models. Thus one of 
the most immediate suggestions for future research is to utilize quantitative analysis to a greater 
extent when examining questions like the ones posed in this paper, extending the knowledge of 
what factors can be associated with satisfaction with democracy, and ultimately with 
representation of intra-EU migrants. Considering the failed process of ratification of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, as well as the consistently declining turnout rates in 
elections to the European Parliament, citizen support for the EU at all levels, and intra-EU 
migrant support in particular, is of utmost importance for the legitimacy of the EU and of the 
idea of European citizenship, thus ascribing a vast practical value to future analyses of questions 
like the ones posed in this paper.  
  The perhaps most puzzling finding in this paper does not regard the rather small group of 
Irish in the United Kingdom and British in Ireland (i.e. intra-EU migrants with voting rights), 
however, but rather the larger group of intra-EU migrants without voting rights. The fact that 
these are more likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country of residence than citizens, 
the exact opposite of what was expected, is surprising. A possible reason for this pattern is that 
intra-EU migrants are different from citizens in some crucial ways—they have gone through a lot 
of trouble to get to where they are; they most likely have learned to master a foreign language to 
be able to migrate within the EU (this would not be the case for intra-EU migrants with voting 
rights); and they have left their home country behind. The possibility that an immigrant can feel 
more affinity towards a country than a national is startling, but it may be the key to the puzzle 
presented in this paper. Whether or not this is the case is another challenge for future research. 
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  Taken together, the pattern displayed in Figure 1.A, and the fact that despite the absence 
of the right to vote in national elections in their country of residence, intra-EU migrants are more 
likely to be satisfied with democracy than the citizens themselves, may be an indication that 
virtual representation, in the more general sense, takes the place of the narrower notion of 
institutionalized representation, at least in the mind of the masses. That the elites at the European 
level argue for institutionalized representation, on the other hand, shows that the duality of and 
the tension between virtual and actual representation, as suggested by Hanna Pitkin 40 years ago, 
very much exists, still today. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Sample 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
demcount 132164  2.648611 0.784566 1  4
demeu 117225  2.450171 0.778319 1  4
migvote 132164  0.004109 0.063966 0 1
mignovote 132164  0.018855 0.136015 0  1
idecit 132164  1.508875 1.348956 0  5
euatt 132164  2.421764 0.757381 1  3
polcon 132164  1.913025 0.623018 1  3
timeelec 132164  683.5295 439.7482 6  1814
student 132164  0.098249 0.297652 0  1
age 132164  44.88163 17.61691 15  99
edu 132164  18.56492 5.01279 6  94
gen 132164  0.505735 0.499969 0  1
 
Eurobarometer questions used in the analysis
10: 
 
B  Country code 
 
Q 1  What is your nationality? 
 
Q 2  When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters 
frequently, occasionally, or never? 
 
Q 8  Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European 
Union is…a good thing; a bad thing; neither good nor bad? 
 
Q 39a  On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
 
Q 39b And how about the way democracy works in the European Union? 
 
D1  In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your 
views on this scale? 
 
D8  How old were you when you stopped full-time education? 
 
D10 Gender 
 
D11  How old are you? 
                                                 
10 The question numbering used here is from the most recent available survey – the Eurobarometer 61.0. Question 
numbering may vary across surveys, but the question wording is the same, if not indicated. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Cleaning of the Survey Analysis Sample 
Survey 
(Year) 
Original  
Survey 
Sample 
Non-EU/ 
Dual 
Citizens 
Other 
Missing 
Values 
Analysis 
Sample 
(Y1) 
Y2  (EU-
Dem.) 
Missing 
Analysis 
Sample 
(Y2) 
Intra-EU 
Migrants 
(Y1/ Y2) 
EB 48.0 
(1997)  16,186 -35  -3,879  12,272 -1,673 10,599  312/274 
EB 49 
(1998)  16,165 -46  -3,905  12,214 -1,752 10,462  284/257 
EB 51.0 
(1999)  16,179 -50  -4,219  11,910 -1,410 10,500  284/258 
EB 52.0 
(1999)  16,071 -50  -4,132  11,889 -1,438 10,451  269/246 
EB 53 
(2000)  16,078 -59  -4,387  11,632 -1,161 10,471  258/239 
EB 54.1 
(2000)  16,067 -54  -4,416  11,597 -1,163 10,434  273/259 
EB 56.2 
(2001)  15,939 -52  -4,128  11,759 -1,310 10,449  262/252 
EB 58.1 
(2002)  16,074 -36  -3,831  12,207 -1,339 10,868  276/267 
EB 59.1 
(2003)  16,307 -46  -4,161  12,100 -1,125 10,975  261/244 
EB 60.1 
(2003)  16,082 -52  -3,918  12,112 -1,338 10,774  274/259 
EB 61.0 
(2004)  16,216 -50  -3,694  12,472 -1,230 11,242  282/268 
TOTAL 177,364  -530  -44,670  132,164  -14,939  117,225  3,035/2,823 
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Table 2: The Variables, Their Operational Definitions, and Their Sources 
 
Variable Definition  Question 
Dependent variables: 
Y1   Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country of 
residence (Ordinal variable coded 4 if very satisfied; 3 if fairly 
satisfied; 2 if not very satisfied; and 1 if not at all satisfied) 
Q39a 
Y2    Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European 
Union (Ordinal variable coded 4 if very satisfied; 3 if fairly 
satisfied; 2 if not very satisfied; and 1 if not at all satisfied) 
Q39b 
Independent variables: 
migvote    Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is an intra-EU 
migrant with the right to vote in national elections, and 0 
otherwise (0,1) 
B/Q1 
mignovote    Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is an intra-EU 
migrant without the right to vote in national elections, and 0 
otherwise (0,1) 
B/Q1 
idecit  Ideological distance of self-placement on a 10-point left-right 
continuum and the placement of the median citizen respondent 
in the survey and in the country of residence  
(Ordinal variable able to take on values between 0 and 10) 
D1 
idecitmignovote  Interaction term of idecit × mignovote  D1/B/Q1 
euatt  Attitude regarding whether the EU-membership of the country 
of residence is good, bad, or neither (Ordinal variable coded 1 
if bad; 2 if neither good nor bad; and 3 if  good) 
Q8 
polcon  Frequency of discussion of political matters with friends 
(Ordinal variable coded 1 if never; 2 if occasionally; and 3 if  
frequently) 
Q2 
timeelec  Time in days since the most recent national parliamentary 
election 
* 
student  Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a student, and 0 
otherwise (0,1) 
D8 
age  Age in years  D11 
edu  Age at the time of stopping full-time education  D8 
male  Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is male, and 0 
otherwise (0,1) 
D10 
survey  Set of 11 dummy variables (one for each survey), omitting EB 
48.0 as a reference category 
 
intcount  Set of 15 dummy variables (one for each interview country), 
omitting France as a reference category 
B 
* Information on the various election dates was collected from http://www.electionguide.org/.
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Table 3: Results of Ordered Logit Regression Analyses (Standard Errors in Parantheses) 
 
  Dependent Variable 1  Dependent Variable 2 
Independent Variable 
Satisfaction with 
Member-State 
Democracy  
Satisfaction with  
EU-Democracy 
    
Migrant with Voting Rights  -1.1744 *** 
(0.0842) 
0.4269 *** 
(0.0970)  
Migrant without Voting Rights  0.3159 *** 
(0.0600) 
0.4039 *** 
(0.0626) 
Ideological Distance  -0.0554 *** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0430 *** 
(0.0043) 
Ideological Distance × MigNoVote  -0.0379  
(0.0316) 
-0.0579 † 
(0.0329) 
Attitude towards the EU  0.5976 *** 
(0.0075) 
0.9816 *** 
(0.0083) 
Political Connectedness  -0.0756 *** 
(0.0091) 
-0.1720 *** 
(0.0097) 
Time since Most Recent Election  -0.0001 *** 
(0.00001) 
-0.00005 *** 
(0.00001) 
Student 0.1322  *** 
(0.0201) 
0.1479 *** 
(0.0212) 
Age 0.0001   
(0.0003) 
-0.0042 *** 
(0.0004) 
Education 0.0039  ** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0121 *** 
(0.0013) 
Male 0.0576  *** 
(0.0107) 
-0.1078 *** 
(0.0114) 
    
Log Likelihood  -142,050.26  -122,492.31 
χ
2 19,023.58 23,034.01 
Pseudo R
2 0.0628 0.0859 
Percent Correctly Predicted  54.1%  53.3% 
N  132,164 117,225 
Notes:   † Significant at 0.10 level; * Significant at 0.05 level; ** Significant at 0.01 level;  
***Significant at 0.001 level.  
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Table 4: Predicted probabilities by Migrant and Voting Rights Status for the Ordered 
Logit Model 
 
Democracy in the Country of Residence 
Not at All 
Satisfied 
Not Very 
Satisfied 
Fairly 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
Migrants without Voting Rights  (N=2,492)  5.30%  23.41% 59.76% 11.54% 
Migrants with Voting Rights (N=543)  19.89%  44.23%  33.03%  2.85% 
Citizens  (N=129,129)  7.13% 28.45%  55.74% 8.68% 
Democracy in the EU 
Not at All 
Satisfied 
Not Very 
Satisfied 
Fairly 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
Migrants without Voting Rights  (N=2,383) 6.65% 32.17%  55.20% 5.98% 
Migrants with Voting Rights (N=440)  6.51%  31.77%  55.61%  6.11% 
Citizens  (N=114,402)  9.64% 39.09%  47.20% 4.07% 
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Figure 1.A: Predicted Probabilities of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Country of 
Residence 
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Figure 1.B: Predicted probabilities of Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU 
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Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated logit equations in Table 4.  
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